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Abstract 
With the emergence of Bitcoin and recently proposed stablecoins from BigTechs, such as 
Diem (formerly Libra), central banks face growing competition from private actors offering 
their own digital alternative to physical cash. We do not address the normative question 
whether a central bank should issue a central bank digital currency (CBDC) or not. Instead, 
we contribute to the current research debate by showing how a central bank could do so, if 
desired. We propose a token-based system without distributed ledger technology and show 
how earlier-deployed, software-only electronic cash can be improved upon to preserve 
transaction privacy, meet regulatory requirements in a compelling way, and offer a level of 
quantum-resistant protection against systemic privacy risk. Neither monetary policy nor 
financial stability would be materially affected because a CBDC with this design would 
replicate physical cash rather than bank deposits. 
JEL: E42, E51, E52, E58, G2 
Keywords: Digital currencies, central bank, CBDC, blind signatures, stablecoins 
* David Chaum (david@chaum.com), Christian Grothoff (christian.grothoff@bfh.ch), Thomas Moser 
(thomas.moser@snb.ch). We would like to thank Michael Barczay, Roman Baumann, Morten Bech, Nicolas 
Cuche, Florian Dold, Andreas Fuster, Stefan Kügel, Benjamin Müller, Dirk Niepelt, Oliver Sigrist, Richard 
Stallman, Andreas Wehrli, and three anonymous referees for comments and suggestions. The views, opinions, 
findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this paper are strictly those of the author(s). They 
do not necessarily reflect the views of the Swiss National Bank (SNB). The SNB takes no responsibility for 





Ever since the rise of personal computers in the 1980s, and especially since the 
National Science Foundation removed its restrictions on using the Internet for commercial 
purposes in 1991, there has been a quest to create digital cash for online payments. The 
earliest proposal was by Chaum (1983). Even though such schemes were implemented, 
they did not catch on; instead, credit card systems became the dominant online payment 
method. Nakamoto’s (2008) proposal for a purely peer-to-peer version of digital cash and 
the subsequent successful launch of Bitcoin have unleashed a new era of digital cash 
research and development. CoinMarketCap lists over 5,000 cryptocurrencies. Recently, 
central banks have started to consider, or at least study, the issuance of digital currencies 
(see Auer et. al. 2020, Boar et al. 2020, Kiff et al. 2020, and Mancini-Griffoli et al. 2018). 
Currently, central banks issue two types of money: (i) reserves in the form of 
settlement accounts at the central banks for selected financial market participants and (ii) 
currency in the form of banknotes available to the public. Accordingly, the literature on 
central bank digital currency (CBDC) distinguishes between (a) wholesale CBDC with 
limited access and (b) retail CBDC accessible to the public (see, e.g., Bech and Garratt 
2017). A wholesale CBDC would be less disruptive to the current system since banks and 
selected financial market participants already have access to digital central bank money in 
the form of central bank accounts, which they use to settle interbank payments. Here, the 
question is whether the tokenization of central bank money and distributed ledger 
technology (DLT) offer distinct benefits over the existing real-time gross settlement 
(RTGS) systems. Thus far, the conclusion is that they do not, at least for domestic 
interbank payments (see Chapman et al. 2017). 
A retail CBDC, which would be a new form of publicly available central bank 
money, could be more disruptive to the current system, depending on its design. The more 
such a CBDC would compete with commercial bank deposits, the greater the threat to bank 
funding with a potential adverse impact on bank credit and economic activity (see Agur et 




Berentsen and Schär 2018, Bindseil 2020, Niepelt 2020, Sveriges Riksbank 2020, and Bank 
of England 2020). Making electronic central bank money without counterparty risk 
available to everyone could improve the stability and resilience of the retail payment 
system. It could also provide a neutral payment infrastructure to promote competition, 
efficiency, and innovation. Overall, the costs and benefits of a retail CBDC are likely to 
differ from one country to another. For the view of the Swiss National Bank, which has no 
plans to issue a retail CBDC, see Jordan (2019). 
The present paper focuses on retail CBDC, but we do not address whether a central 
bank should issue a CBDC. Instead, we focus on the potential design of CBDC. There has 
recently been increasing interest in CBDC design (see e.g. Allen et al. (2020), Bank of 
England (2020)). The design that we propose differs significantly from other proposals. 
Our system builds on and improves the eCash technology described by Chaum (1983) and 
Chaum et al. (1990). In particular, we propose a token-based, software-only CBDC without 
DLT. DLT is an interesting design if no central party is available or if the interacting 
entities are not willing to agree on a trusted central party. However, this is hardly the case 
for a retail CBDC issued by a central bank. Distributing the central bank’s ledger with a 
blockchain merely increases transaction costs; it does not provide tangible benefits in a 
central bank deployment. Utilizing DLT to issue digital cash may be useful if there is no 
central bank to start with (e.g., the Marshall Islands’ Sovereign project) or if the explicit 
intention is to do without a central bank (e.g., Bitcoin).1 
The token-based CBDC proposed here also allows the preservation of a key feature 
of physical cash: transaction privacy. It is usually argued that cryptographic privacy 
protections are so computationally demanding that the high resource requirements make 
their use on mobile devices infeasible (see Allen et al. 2020). While this may be true in the 
context of DLT, where public traceability of transactions is necessary to prevent double-
 
1 There may be good use cases for DLT in the case of financial market infrastructure, such as digital 
exchanges, where the question of how to get central bank money onto the DLT for settlement purposes 
arises. However, in those situations, the potential benefits of DLT, e.g., lower costs or automatic 





spending (Narayanan et al. 2016), it is not true for the Chaum-style blind-signature protocol 
with a central bank proposed in the present paper. Our CBDC, based on blind signatures 
and a two-tier architecture, guarantees perfect, quantum-resistant transaction privacy while 
providing anti-money laundering (AML) and counter terrorism financing (CFT) protections 
for society that are actually stronger than those of banknotes. 
Transaction privacy is important for three reasons. First, it protects users from 
government scrutiny and surveillance abuses. Mass surveillance programs are problematic 
even if people believe they have nothing to hide, simply because of the potential for error 
and abuse, particularly if such programs lack transparency and accountability (see Solove 
2011). Second, transaction privacy protects users from data exploitation by payment service 
providers. Third, it protects users from the other party in a transaction, ruling out the 
possibility of ex-post opportunistic behavior or security risks due to the failure or neglect of 
customer data protection (see Kahn et al. 2005). 
The paper is structured as follows: In Section II, we explain the difference between 
central bank money and other monies. In Section III, we review common, simplistic CBDC 
designs before proposing our design in Section IV. We then discuss regulatory and policy 
considerations (V) and related work (VI) and conclude (VII). 
II. What Is Central Bank Money? 
Money is an asset that can be used to purchase goods and services. To be considered 
money, the asset must be accepted by entities other than the issuer. This is why vouchers, 
for instance, are not considered money. Genuine money must be commonly accepted as a 
medium of exchange. While money has other functions—such as being a unit of account 
and a store of value—its distinguishing feature is its function as a medium of exchange. 
Normally, the unit of account (i.e., how prices are quoted and debts are recorded) coincides 




the medium of exchange lacks stability in value relative to the goods and services traded.2 
Money must also be a store of value to act as a medium of exchange because it has to 
preserve its purchasing power between the time it is received and spent. However, several 
other assets serve as stores of value, such as equities, bonds, precious metals, and real 
estate. Being a store of value is thus not a distinctive feature of money. 
In a modern economy, the public uses two different types of money: (a) state money 
and (b) private money. State money is typically issued by the central bank, acting as an 
agent of the state. Central bank money is available to selected financial institutions in the 
form of deposits at the central bank (reserves) and to the public in the form of currency 
(i.e., banknotes and coins), also referred to as “cash.” In a modern fiat money economy, 
such money has no intrinsic value. Legally, it is a liability of the central bank, although it is 
not redeemable. In most countries, central bank money is defined as legal tender, which 
means that it must be accepted toward repayment of a monetary debt, including taxes and 
legal fines. While this ensures that central bank money has some value, having legal-tender 
status is insufficient for central bank money to maintain a stable value. Rather, it is the 
central banks’ monetary policy that maintains the money’s value. Maintaining price 
stability—that is, a stable value of money relative to the value of the goods and services 
traded—is one of the central banks’ main responsibilities. 
Most payments in a modern economy are made with private money issued by 
commercial banks. Such money is composed of demand deposits that people have at 
commercial banks. These bank deposits can be accessed with checks, debit cards, credit 
cards, or other means of transferring money. They are a liability of the respective 
commercial bank. A key feature of bank deposits is that commercial banks guarantee 
convertibility on demand to central bank money at a fixed price, namely, at par. Depositors 
 
2 This can occur spontaneously in a high-inflation environment, e.g., when prices are quoted in USD but 
payments are made in local currency. The same is true for payments in Bitcoin, where prices are usually 
quoted in USD or other local currencies because of Bitcoin’s high volatility. A separation can also occur by 
design, e.g., the Unidad de Fomento (UF) in Chile or the Special Drawing Right (SDR) of the International 




can withdraw their funds in cash or transfer the funds at a fixed rate of 1:1. Pegging their 
money to central bank money is how commercial banks maintain the value of their money. 
Nevertheless, in a fractional reserve system, a commercial bank—even if solvent—
may lack the liquidity to honor its promise to convert bank deposits to central bank money 
(e.g., in the case of a bank run) such that customers cannot withdraw their money. A bank 
can also become insolvent and go bankrupt, and customers can lose money as a result. 
Thus, commercial banks are regulated to mitigate such risks. 
A significant difference between central bank money and privately issued commercial 
bank money is, therefore, that the latter entails counterparty risk. A central bank can always 
meet its obligations using its own nonredeemable money. Central bank money is the only 
monetary asset in a domestic economy without credit and liquidity risk. Therefore, it is 
typically the preferred asset to settle payments in financial market infrastructures (see, e.g., 
CPMI-IOSCO Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (2012)). Another difference 
is that central bank money anchors the domestic monetary system by providing a reference 
of value with which private commercial bank monies maintain par convertibility. 
Apart from commercial banks, other private entities occasionally attempt to issue 
money; cryptocurrencies are only the most recent attempt. But unlike bank deposits, such 
money is not commonly accepted as a medium of exchange. This is also true of Bitcoin, the 
most widely accepted cryptocurrency. One impediment to their usefulness as a medium of 
exchange is the high volatility of their value. A recent response to this problem was the 
emergence of stablecoins. Stablecoins generally attempt to stabilize their value in one of 
two ways: either by imitating central banks (algorithmic stablecoins) or by imitating 
commercial banks or investment vehicles (asset-backed stablecoins).3 
“Algorithmic stablecoins” rely on algorithms to adjust their supply. In other words, 
they attempt to achieve price stability with their own “algorithmic monetary policy.” There 
are examples of such stablecoins (e.g., Nubits), but so far, none has successfully stabilized 
its value over a long period of time. 
 




“Asset-backed” stablecoins differ according to the type of assets used and the legal 
rights that holders of stablecoins acquire. The types of assets typically used are money 
(central bank reserves, banknotes or commercial bank deposits), commodities (e.g., gold), 
securities, and sometimes other cryptocurrencies. How well such a scheme stabilizes the 
coins’ value relative to the underlying asset(s) depends crucially on the legal rights that 
holders of the stablecoins acquire. If a stablecoin is redeemable at a fixed price (e.g., 1 coin 
= 1 USD, or 1 coin = 1 ounce of gold), such stability can theoretically be achieved.4 What 
the scheme then essentially does is replicate commercial banks by guaranteeing 
convertibility into the underlying asset on demand. However, unlike bank deposits, which 
are typically only partially backed by central bank money reserves, stablecoins are 
generally fully backed by reserves of the underlying asset to avoid liquidity risk, mainly 
because they lack the benefits of public backstops such as deposit insurance and lender-of-
last-resort support that apply to regulated banks. 
Stablecoins backed by money are also called fiat-currency stablecoins. Holding 100 
percent collateral in money (banknotes or bank deposits) is not very profitable, however. 
Accordingly, stablecoin providers have an incentive to economize their asset holdings and 
move to a fractional reserve system, just as commercial banks did.5 This implies that they 
minimize their holdings of low-yielding assets to the minimum considered necessary to 
satisfy the convertibility requirement and add higher-yielding liquid assets such as 
government bonds instead. This improves their profitability but also increases their level of 
risk. However, even if a stablecoin is 100 percent collateralized by commercial bank 
deposits, it is still exposed to the credit and liquidity risks of the underlying bank. This risk 
can be removed if the deposits are held at the central bank so that the stablecoin is backed 
 
4 Whether it also stabilizes the stablecoin’s value relative to the goods and services traded depends on how 
stable the value of the respective asset is relative to the value of the goods and services. 
5 Uncertainty about whether a stablecoin is fully collateralized can be one of the reasons why a stablecoin can 
trade below par in the secondary market (see Lyons and Ganesh Viswanath-Natraj, 2020). This was 
historically also the case with banknotes when they were still issued by commercial banks. Such banknotes 
used to trade at varying discounts in the secondary market before the issuance of banknotes was 




by central bank reserves. Such stablecoins have been called “synthetic CBDCs” (Adrian 
and Mancini-Griffoli 2019). It is important to point out, however, that such stablecoins are 
not central bank money and thus not CBDC since they are not a liability of the central bank 
and, therefore, are still subject to counterparty risk, namely, the risk that the issuer of the 
stablecoin goes bankrupt. 
If a stablecoin is not redeemable at a fixed price, its stability relative to the underlying 
asset is not guaranteed. If the stablecoin nevertheless represents an ownership share of the 
underlying asset, the scheme resembles a closed-end mutual fund or exchange-traded fund 
(ETF), and the corresponding risks apply. The value of the coin will depend on the net asset 
value of the fund, but its actual value can deviate. If there are authorized participants who 
can create and redeem stablecoins and thus act as arbitrageurs, as in the case of ETFs and as 
envisaged for Diem (Libra Association 2020), the deviation is likely to be small. 
Overall, stablecoins have a greater chance of becoming money than do 
cryptocurrencies, especially if properly regulated. However, the availability of CBDCs 
would significantly limit their usefulness. 
III. Simplistic CBDC Designs 
As noted, a CBDC would be a liability of the central bank. Two possible designs 
discussed in the literature are (a) an account-based CBDC and (b) a token-based (or valued-
based) CBDC. These correspond to the two existing types of central bank money and 
corresponding payment systems (Kahn and Roberds 2008): central bank reserves (an 
account-based system) and banknotes (a token-based system). A payment occurs if a 
monetary asset is transferred from a payer to a payee. In an account-based system, a 
transfer occurs by charging the payer’s account and crediting the payee’s account. In a 
token-based system, the transfer occurs by transferring the value itself or a token, that is, an 
object that represents the monetary asset. The prime example of a token is cash—coins or 
banknotes. Paying with cash means handing over a coin or banknote. There is no need to 




to reveal their identities at any time during the transaction; both can remain anonymous. 
However, the payee must be able to verify the token’s authenticity. This is why central 
banks invest heavily in security features for banknotes. 
It has been suggested that the distinction between account- and token-based systems 
is not applicable to digital currencies (Garratt et al. 2020). We are of a different opinion 
because we believe there is a significant difference. The critical distinction is the 
information carried by the information asset. In an account-based system, the assets 
(accounts) are associated with transaction histories that include all of the credit and debit 
operations involving the accounts. In a token-based system, the assets (tokens) carry 
information about their value and the entity that issued the token. The only possibility of 
attaining the transaction privacy property of cash, therefore, lies in token-based systems.6 
A. Account-Based CBDC 
The simplest way of launching a CBDC would be to allow the public to hold deposit 
accounts with the central bank. This implies that the central bank would be responsible for 
conducting know-your-customer (KYC) checks and ensuring AML/CFT compliance. This 
would include not only handling the initial KYC process but also authenticating customers 
for bank transactions, managing fraud, and dealing with false-positive and false-negative 
authentications. Given the limited physical presence of central banks in society and the fact 
that citizen authentication is currently not something central banks are likely prepared to do 
on a large scale, any account-based CBDC would require the central bank to outsource 
these checks. The entire servicing and maintenance of such accounts could be assigned to 
third-party providers (Bindseil 2020), or legislation could mandate commercial banks to 
open central bank accounts for their customers (Berentsen and Schär 2018). 
 
6 While the term “Bitcoin” suggests the use of a token, Bitcoin is an account-based system. The only 
difference between a traditional account-based system and a blockchain is that the accounts are not kept in a 




Such an account-based CBDC would would potentially give a central bank a lot of 
information. One possible concern could be that this would allow governments to easily 
perform mass surveillance and levy sanctions against individual account holders. Their 
centralized nature makes such interventions inexpensive and easy to enforce against 
individuals or groups. Even in democracies, there are many examples of abuses of 
surveillance targeting critics and political opponents. One could argue that independent 
central banks could safeguard such information from government scrutiny and political 
abuse, but this would only open up a new avenue for political pressure, threatening central 
bank independence. In addition, the central database would be a significant target for 
attackers: even read-only access to parts of the database could create significant risks for 
people whose data might be exposed. 
By providing bank accounts to the public, a central bank would also be in direct 
competition with commercial banks. This competition would entail two risks. First, it could 
threaten the deposit base of banks and, in the extreme, disintermediate the banking sector. 
This could adversely affect the availability of credit to the private sector and, as a result, 
economic activity (Agur et al. 2019). The disintermediation of banks could also lead to the 
centralization of the credit allocation process within the central bank, which would 
negatively affect productivity and economic growth. Second, allowing people to shift their 
deposits into a central bank safe haven could speed up bank runs during financial crises. 
However, there are counterarguments. Brunnermeier and Niepelt (2019) argue that 
the transfer of funds from deposit to CBDC accounts would lead to an automatic 
substitution of deposit funding with central bank funding, merely rendering the central 
bank’s implicit lender-of-last-resort guarantee explicit. Berentsen and Schär (2018) 
maintain that competition from central banks could even have a disciplinary effect on 
commercial banks and thus increase financial system stability, as commercial banks would 
have to make their business models more secure to avoid bank runs. 
There are also proposals to mitigate the risk of disintermediation that aim at limiting 
or disincentivizing the use of CBDC as a store of value. One proposal is to cap the amount 




CBDC accounts so that the remuneration is always far enough below the remuneration at 
commercial bank accounts (possibly including a negative return) to make CBDC less 
attractive as a store of value (Kumhof and Noone 2018, Bindseil 2020). Further, to deter 
bank runs, Kumhof and Noone (2018) suggest that CBDC should not be issued against 
bank deposits but only against securities such as government bonds. Overall, an account-
based CBDC would require further analysis of these issues. 
B. Hardware-dependent Token-Based CBDC 
A central bank could also issue electronic tokens instead of accounts. Technically, 
this requires a system of ensuring that the electronic tokens are not copied easily. 
Physically unclonable functions (see Katzenbeisser et al. 2012) and secure zones in 
hardware (see Alves and Felton 2004, Pinto and Santos 2019) are two potential digital 
copy-prevention technologies. Physically unclonable functions, however, cannot be 
exchanged over the Internet (eliminating the main use case of CBDCs), and previous 
security features in copy-prevention hardware have been repeatedly compromised (see, e.g., 
Wojtczuk and Rutkowska 2009, Johnston 2010, Lapid and Wool 2019). 
A key benefit of token-based CBDCs over central bank accounts is that token-based 
systems would work offline; that is, users could exchange tokens (peer-to-peer) without 
involving the central bank, which would protect individuals’ privacy and liberty. However, 
the disintermediation that arises when users can trade electronic tokens without banks as 
intermediaries performing KYC checks and AML/CFT procedures would make it 
challenging to limit criminal abuse. 
SIM cards are currently the most extensively available candidates for a secure 
hardware-based payment system, but they also have risks. Experience (e.g., see Soukup and 
Muff 2007, Garcia et. al. 2008, Kasper et. al. 2010, CCC 2017) suggests that any 
economically producible device that stores tokens with monetary value in an individual’s 
possession, and enables offline transactions—and thus theft by cloning the information it 




from an attack would be sufficiently large. Such attacks include users who attack their own 
hardware (see also Allen et al. 2020). Payment card systems that have previously been 
deployed rely on tamper resistance in combination with fraud detection to limit the impact 
of a compromise. However, fraud detection requires the ability to identify payers and track 
customers, which is not compatible with transaction privacy. 
IV. A Token-Based CBDC Design to Guard Privacy 
The CBDC proposed here is “software-only”, merely a smartphone app that does not 
require any additional hardware from users. The CBDC builds on eCash and GNU Taler. 
Taler is part of the GNU Project, whose founder, Richard Stallman, coined the term “Free 
Software,” currently often referred to as “Free/Libre and Open Source Software” 
(FLOSS).7 Software is considered “Free Software” if its license grants users four essential 
freedoms: the freedom to run the program as they wish, the freedom to study the program 
and change it, the freedom to redistribute copies of the program, and the freedom to 
distribute copies of modified versions of the program. Free Software does not have to be 
noncommercial: providing software support is a standard business model for FLOSS. 
Given the large numbers of stakeholders involved with a retail CBDC (the central 
bank, the financial sector, merchants, and customers) and the critical significance of the 
infrastructure, a retail CBDC should be based on FLOSS. Imposing a proprietary solution 
that requires dependence on a particular vendor would likely be an obstacle to adoption 
from the beginning. With FLOSS, all interested parties have access to every detail of the 
solution and the right to tailor the software to their needs. This leads to easier integration 
 
7 For more information about GNU, see https://www.gnu.org and Stallman (1985). GNU Taler is released 
free of charge under the GNU Affero General Public License by the GNU Project. GNU projects popular 
among economists are the software packages «R» and “GNU Regression, Econometrics and Time-series 
Library” (GRETL). For a discussion of the benefits of FLOSS over proprietary software in research, see 
Baiocchi and Distaso (2003), Yalta and Lucchetti (2008), and Yalta and Yalta (2010). On open source 




and better interoperability and competition among providers.8 Moreover, it enables the 
central bank to meet the requirements for transparency and accountability. The benefits of 
FLOSS for security are also extensively recognized. The availability of the source code and 
the right to modify it make it easier to spot flaws and address them quickly.9 
In our proposed architecture, all consumer and merchant interactions are with 
commercial banks. However, money creation and the database are provided exclusively by 
the central bank. The commercial banks authenticate the customers when they withdraw 
CBDC and the merchants/payees when they receive CBDC, but when spending CBDC, the 
customers/payers only need to authorize their transactions and do not need to identify 
themselves. This makes payments cheaper, easier, and faster, and it avoids easy 
interference with privacy (Dold 2019). In addition, authenticating customers when they 
withdraw CBDC and merchants/payees when they receive CBDC ensures KYC and 
AML/CFT compliance. 
The CBDC proposed in the present paper is a genuine digital bearer instrument 
because when the user withdraws a sum of money in the form of a number, the number is 
“blinded” or hidden by the smartphone in a special encryption. In the actual system, a coin 
is a public/private key pair, with the private key only known to the owner of the coin.10 The 
coin derives its financial value from the central bank’s signature on the coin’s public key. 
The central bank makes the signature with its private key, and it has multiple denomination 
key pairs available for blind-signing coins of different values. A merchant can use the 
central bank’s corresponding “public key” to verify the signature. However, to be sure that 
 
8 There may be some roles for private hardware, however. For example, protecting key stores and certain 
auditing functions, to the extent that such security can be shown to be only additive, may be an area where 
dedicated hardware evaluated by only a limited number of experts could have advantages. 
9 For instance, a cybersecurity bulletin issued by the U.S. National Security Agency in April 2020 urges users 
to prioritize open source software in the selection and use of collaboration services for Internet 
communication: “Open source development can provide accountability that code is written to secure 
programming best practices and isn’t likely to introduce vulnerabilities or weaknesses that could put users 
and data at risk” (U/OO/134598-20). 
10 In Bitcoin, an account-based system, the key pair is an account, with the public key being the “address” of 




the coin has not been copied and already redeemed by another payee (i.e., has not been 
“double-spent”), the merchant must deposit the coin so that the central bank can check the 
coin against a file of redeemed coins. Because neither the commercial bank nor the central 
bank see the coin’s number during withdrawal, later, when the merchant deposits the coin, 
it is unknown which user withdrew it. The blinding and the resulting privacy are what make 
this type of CBDC a true digital bearer instrument. 
In the subsequent discussion, we provide a high-level introduction to the technology 
and demonstrate how it can be integrated with the existing banking system to create a 
CBDC. Dold (2019) describes additional details. 
A. Key Building Blocks 
We now describe the main building blocks of the protocol, including the 
mathematical background for one possible instantiation of the cryptographic primitives 
used, to illustrate how an implementation could work. We note that alternative, equivalent 
mathematical designs exist for each component, and we are merely presenting the simplest 
secure designs of which we are aware of. 
Digital Signatures—The basic idea of digital signatures in a public-key signature 
scheme is that the owner of a private key is the only one able to sign a message, while the 
public key enables anyone to verify the signature’s validity.11 The verification function’s 
output is the binary statement “true” or “false”. If the message is signed with the private 
key that belongs to the public verification key, the output is true; otherwise, it is false. In 
our proposal, the message is a “coin” or “banknote” with a serial number, and the central 
bank’s signature affirms its validity. While GNU Taler by default uses modern EdDSA 
signatures (see Bernstein et al. 2012), we present a simple cryptographic signature scheme 
 
11 Public-key cryptography was introduced by Diffie and Hellmann (1976), and the first implementation of 




based on the well-studied RSA cryptosystem (Rivest et al. 1978).12 However, in principle, 
any cryptographic signature scheme (DSA, ECDSA, EdDSA, RSA, etc.) can be used. 
To generate RSA keys, a signer first picks two independent large primes 𝑝𝑝 and 𝑞𝑞 and 
computes 𝑛𝑛 � 𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞 as well as Euler’s totient function 𝜙𝜙�𝑛𝑛� � �𝑝𝑝 � 1��𝑞𝑞 � 1�. Then, any 𝑒𝑒 
with 1 � 𝑒𝑒 � 𝜙𝜙�𝑛𝑛� and 𝑙𝑙�𝑑𝑑�𝑒𝑒,𝜙𝜙�𝑛𝑛�� � 1 can be used to define a public key �𝑒𝑒,𝑛𝑛�. The 
condition that the greatest common divisor (gcd) of 𝑒𝑒 and 𝜙𝜙�𝑛𝑛� has to be 1 (i.e., that they 
have to be relatively prime) ensures that the inverse of 𝑒𝑒 mod 𝜙𝜙�𝑛𝑛� exists. This inverse is 
the corresponding private key d. Given 𝜙𝜙�𝑛𝑛�, the private key d can be computed using the 
extended Euclidian algorithm such that 𝑑𝑑 𝑑 𝑒𝑒 𝑑 1 mod 𝜙𝜙�𝑛𝑛�. 
Given the private key d and the public key (e, n), a simple RSA signature s over a 
message m is 𝑠𝑠 𝑑 𝑠𝑠�  mod 𝑛𝑛. To verify the signature, 𝑠𝑠� 𝑑 𝑠𝑠� mod 𝑛𝑛 is computed. If 𝑠𝑠𝑚 
and m match, the signature is valid, which proves that the message was signed with the 
private key that belongs to the public verification key (message authentication) and that the 
message has not been changed in transit (message integrity). In practice, signatures are put 
over messages’ hashes rather than the messages themselves. Hash functions compute 
digests of messages, which are short, unique identifiers for messages. Signing a short hash 
is much faster than signing a large message, and most signature algorithms only work on 
relatively short inputs.13 
Blind Signatures—We use blind signatures, introduced by Chaum (1983), to protect 
the privacy of buyers. A blind signature is used to create a cryptographic signature for a 
message without the signer learning the contents of the message being signed. In our 
proposal, it prevents commercial banks and the central bank from tracing purchases back to 
the buyers. Our proposal works in principle with any blind signature scheme, but the best 
solution is still the RSA-based variant described by Chaum (1983). 
 
12 For a discussion of the RSA cryptosystem’s long history and a survey of attacks on the RSA cryptosystem, 
see Boneh (1999). 




The blinding is done by the customers, who blind their coins before transmitting them 
to the central bank for signature. The customers therefore do not need to trust the central 
bank for privacy protection. Furthermore, RSA blinding would provide privacy protection 
even against quantum computer attacks. The central bank, for its part, sets up multiple-
denomination key pairs available for blind-signing coins of different values, and it 
publishes/provides the corresponding public keys (e, n) for these values. 
Let 𝑓𝑓 be the hash value of a coin and thus a unique identifier for the coin. The 
customer withdrawing the coin first generates a random blinding factor 𝑏𝑏 and computes 
𝑓𝑓� ≡ 𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏�  mod 𝑛𝑛 with the central bank’s public key for that value. The blinded coin 𝑓𝑓𝑓 is 
then transmitted to the central bank for signature. The central bank signs 𝑓𝑓𝑓 with its private 
key 𝑑𝑑 by computing the blind signature 𝑠𝑠� ≡ �𝑓𝑓��� mod 𝑛𝑛, appends the signature 𝑠𝑠𝑓 to the 
blinded coin 𝑓𝑓𝑓 and returns the pair �𝑠𝑠�,𝑓𝑓𝑓� to the customer. The customer can then unblind 
the signature by computing 𝑠𝑠 ≡ 𝑠𝑠�𝑏𝑏�� mod 𝑛𝑛. This works because �𝑓𝑓��� � 𝑓𝑓�𝑏𝑏�� � 𝑓𝑓�𝑏𝑏 
and, thus, multiplying 𝑠𝑠𝑓 with 𝑏𝑏�� yields 𝑓𝑓�, which is a valid RSA signature over 𝑓𝑓 as 
before: 𝑠𝑠� ≡ 𝑓𝑓�� ≡ 𝑓𝑓 mod 𝑛𝑛. 
In Chaum’s original proposal, the coins were just tokens. However, we want 
consumers to be able to enter into contracts using digital signatures. To achieve this, 
whenever a digital wallet withdraws a coin, it first creates a random coin private key 𝑐𝑐 and 
computes the corresponding coin public key 𝐶𝐶 for creating digital signatures with regular 
cryptographic signature schemes (such as DSA, ECDSA, EdDSA, and RSA). Then, 𝑓𝑓 is 
derived using a cryptographic hash function from the public key 𝐶𝐶, which is then blindly 
signed by the central bank (using a fresh random blinding factor for each coin). Now, the 
customer can use 𝑐𝑐 to sign purchases electronically, thereby spending the coin. 
As noted above, the central bank would establish key pairs for different coin values 
and publish the public keys that customers could use to withdraw money. These 
denomination keys, and thus the coins, would have an expiration date before which they 
must be spent or exchanged for new coins. Customers would be given a certain amount of 




banknotes, where banknote series are regularly renewed so that the banknotes can be 
equipped with the latest security features, except that banknotes usually remain in 
circulation for decades rather than a few months or years.14  
From a technical point of view, an expiration date has two advantages. First, it 
improves the efficiency of the system because the central bank can discard expired entries 
and does not have to store and search an ever-growing list of (spent) coins to detect double-
spending. Second, it reduces security risks because the central bank does not have to worry 
about attacks against its expired (private) denomination keys (d). Moreover, even if a 
private key is compromised, the window during which the attacker can use the key is 
limited. In addition, charging an exchange fee would allow the central bank to implement 
negative interest rates, if deemed necessary. The central bank could also impose a 
conversion limit per customer for AML/CFT (“cash” limits) or financial stability reasons 
(to prevent hoarding or bank runs), if desired. 
Key-Exchange Protocol—GNU Taler uses a key-exchange protocol in an unusual 
way to provide a link between an original coin and the change rendered for that original 
coin. This ensures that change can always be given without compromising income 
transparency or consumer privacy. The same mechanism can also be used to give 
anonymous customer refunds. The protocol also handles network and component failures, 
ensuring that payments either definitively succeeded or were definitively aborted and that 
all parties have cryptographic proof of the outcome. This is approximately equivalent to 
atomic swaps in interledger protocols or fair exchange in traditional e-cash systems. 
The most common mathematical construction for a key-exchange protocol is the 
Diffie-Hellman construction (Diffie and Hellman 1976). It enables two parties to derive a 
shared secret key. To do this, they share two domain parameters p and g, which can be 
 
14 In Switzerland, for instance, the Swiss National Bank began phasing out its eighth banknote series in April 
2016. These banknotes were put into circulation in the late-1990s. Effective 1 January 2020, however, all 
banknotes starting from the sixth series issued in 1976 as well as any future series remain valid and can be 




public, where p is a large prime number and g is a primitive root modulo p.15 Now, the two 
parties chose their private keys a and b, which are two large integers. With these private 
keys and the domain parameters, they generate their respective public keys 𝐴𝐴 𝐴 𝐴𝐴� mod 𝑝𝑝 
and 𝐵𝐵 𝐴 𝐴𝐴� mod 𝑝𝑝. Each party can now use its own private key and the other party’s public 
key to compute the shared secret key � 𝐴 �𝐴𝐴��� 𝐴 �𝐴𝐴��� 𝐴 𝐴𝐴��  mod 𝑝𝑝.16 
To obtain change, a customer starts with the private key of the partially spent coin c. 
Let C be the corresponding public key, e.g., 𝐶𝐶 � 𝐴𝐴� mod 𝑝𝑝. When the coin was previously 
partially spent, the central bank recorded the transaction involving C in its database. For 
simplicity, we will assume that a denomination exists that precisely matches this residual 
value. If not, the change protocol can simply be performed repeatedly until all of the 
change is obtained. Let �𝑒𝑒,𝑛𝑛� be the denomination key for the change to be issued. 
To obtain the change, the customer first creates 𝜅𝜅 private transfer keys 𝑡𝑡� for 𝑖𝑖 𝑖
�1, … , 𝜅𝜅� and computes the corresponding public keys 𝑇𝑇�. These 𝜅𝜅 transfer keys are simply 
public-private key pairs that allow the customer to run the key-exchange protocol locally—
with the customer playing both sides—𝜅𝜅 times between c and each 𝑡𝑡�. If Diffie-Hellman is 
used for the key-exchange protocol, we will have 𝑇𝑇� 𝐴 𝐴𝐴��  mod 𝑝𝑝. 
The result is three transfer secrets 𝐾𝐾� 𝐴 𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾�𝑐𝑐, 𝑡𝑡��. The key-exchange protocol can be 
used in different ways to arrive at the same value 𝐾𝐾� 𝐴 𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾�𝐶𝐶, 𝑡𝑡�� � 𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾�𝑐𝑐,𝑇𝑇��. Given 𝐾𝐾�, 
the customer uses a cryptographic hash function H to derive values �𝑏𝑏� , 𝑐𝑐�� 𝐴 𝐻𝐻�𝐾𝐾��, where 
𝑏𝑏� is a valid blinding factor for the denomination key �𝑒𝑒,𝑛𝑛� and 𝑐𝑐� is a private key for the 
fresh coin to be obtained as change. 𝑐𝑐� must be suitable for both creating cryptographic 
 
15 An integer g is a primitive root modulo p if for every integer a coprime to p, there is some integer k for 
which 𝐴𝐴� 𝐴 𝑎𝑎 �mod 𝑝𝑝�. In practice, g should be such a primitive p-1th root, which is also called a 
generator, in order to prevent subgroup attacks such as Pohlig-Hellman attacks (see Lim and Pil, 1997). 
16 The same mechanism could also be used to ensure that coins are not transferred to a third party during 
withdrawal. To achieve this, consumers would need to safeguard a long-term identity key. Then, the 
withdrawal process could use the same construction that GNU Taler uses to obtain change, except a 
customer's long-term identity key would be used instead of the original coin when withdrawing from the 
customer's bank account. However, a customer’s failure to safeguard the long-term identity key could void 
the privacy assurances and enable the theft of all remaining coins. Given the limited risk in transfers to third 




signatures and for future use with the key-exchange protocol (as c, to obtain change from 
the change). Let 𝐶𝐶� be the public key corresponding to 𝑐𝑐�. The customer then requests the 
central bank to create a blind signature over 𝐶𝐶� for ∈ �1, … , 𝜅𝜅�.17 In this request, the 
customer also commits to the public keys 𝑇𝑇�. The request is authorized using a signature 
made with the private key c. 
Instead of directly returning the blind signature, the central bank first challenges the 
customer to prove that the customer used the above construction correctly by providing a 
𝛾𝛾 ∈ �1, … . , 𝜅𝜅�. The customer must then reveal the 𝑡𝑡� for � � 𝛾𝛾 to the central bank. The 
central bank can then compute 𝐾𝐾� 𝑓 𝐾𝐾��𝐶𝐶, 𝑡𝑡�� and derive the �𝑏𝑏� , 𝑐𝑐�� values. If for all � �
𝛾𝛾, the provided 𝑡𝑡� prove that the customer used the construction correctly, the central bank 
returns the blind signature over 𝐶𝐶�. If the customer fails to provide a correct proof, the 
residual value of the original coin is forfeited. This effectively punishes those trying to 
evade income transparency with an expected tax rate of 1 � ��. 
To prevent a customer from conspiring with a merchant who is trying to obscure its 
income, the central bank allows anyone who knows C to, at any time, obtain the values of 
𝑇𝑇� and the associated blind signatures of all coins linked to the original coin C. This allows 
the owner of the original coin—who knows c—to compute 𝐾𝐾� 𝑓 𝐾𝐾��𝑐𝑐,𝑇𝑇�� and, from 
there, to derive �𝑏𝑏� , 𝑐𝑐�� and, finally, to unblind the blind signature. Consequently, a 
merchant hiding income in this way would basically form a limited economic union with 
the customer instead of obtaining exclusive control. 
B. System Architecture 
A key objective of our architecture is to ensure that central banks do not have to 
interact directly with customers or retain any information about them, merely maintaining a 
list of spent coins. The authentication is delegated to commercial banks that have the 
 
17 If the RSA cryptosystem were to be used for blind signatures, we would use 𝑓𝑓 𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓��𝐶𝐶��, where 




necessary infrastructure already in place. Withdrawal and deposit protocols reach the 
central bank via a commercial bank as an intermediary. From the customer standpoint, the 
process is analogous to withdrawing physical cash from an ATM. The transaction between 
a user’s commercial bank and the central bank occurs in the background. Withdrawing 
CBDC would proceed as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. CBDC Withdrawal 
 
 
A customer (1) provides authentication to his or her commercial bank using the 
respective commercial bank’s authentication and authorization procedures. Next, the 
customer’s phone (or computer) obtains the public denomination key (e, n) provided by the 




and a public key C, and chooses a blinding factor b. The coin’s public key is then hashed 
(→ f) and blinded (→ 𝑓𝑓�). Next, (3) the customer’s phone sends 𝑓𝑓� together with an 
authorization to withdraw the coin and debit the customer’s account to the commercial 
bank via an established secure channel. The commercial bank then (4) debits the amount 
from the customer’s deposit account, (5) digitally authorizes the request with its own bank-
branch digital signature and forwards the request and the blinded coin to the central bank 
for signing. The central bank (6) deducts the value of the coin from the commercial bank’s 
central bank account, blindly signs the coin with the central bank’s private key for the 
respective value, and (7) returns the blind signature s' to the commercial bank. The 
commercial bank (8) forwards the blind signature s' to the customer’s electronic wallet. 
Finally, the customer’s phone (9) uses b to unblind the signature (→ f) and stores the newly 
minted coin (c, s). 
When spending CBDC, the process is analogous to paying merchants in cash. 
However, to ensure settlement, the merchants must deposit the coins. Spending CBDC 
proceeds as shown in Figure 2. 
A customer and a merchant negotiate a business contract, and (1) the customer uses 
an electronic coin to sign the contract/bill of sale with the coin’s private key c and transmits 
the signature to the merchant. A coin’s signature on a contract with a valid coin is an 
instruction from the customer to pay the merchant who is identified by the bank account in 
the contract. Customers may sign a contract with multiple coins if a single coin is 
insufficient to pay the total amount. The merchant then (2) validates the signature of the 
coin over the contract and the signature s of the central bank over f corresponding to the 
coin’s C with the respective public keys and forwards the signed coin (together with the 
merchant’s account information) to the merchant’s commercial bank. The merchant’s 
commercial bank (3) confirms that the merchant is one of its customers and forwards the 
signed coin to the central bank. The central bank (4) verifies the signatures and checks its 
database to ensure that the coin has not previously been spent. If everything is in order, (5) 




account at the central bank and (6) sends a confirmation to the commercial bank to that 
effect. Next, (7) the commercial bank credits the merchant’s account and (8) informs the 
merchant. The merchant (9) delivers the product/service to the customer. The entire process 
takes only a few hundred milliseconds. 
 




C. Security Considerations 
Our proposal requires the central bank to operate a high-availability online service 




can copy electronic coins. While theoretical solutions exist to retroactively identify users 
who engage in double-spending (see Chaum et al. 1990), these solutions create an 
economic risk for both users and the central bank, owing to the delayed identification of 
fraudulent transactions. Online double-spending detection eliminates this risk but in turn 
implies that transactions will be impossible if Internet connectivity to the central bank is 
unavailable. 
The central bank will also need to protect the confidentiality of the private keys it 
uses to sign coins and other protocol messages. If the central bank’s signing key(s) are ever 
compromised, such as by a quantum computer, by a physical attack on data-center vaults, 
or perhaps by some new unforeseen algorithm, the users can securely, and without 
compromising privacy, be refunded all the coins that they have not spent. The central bank 
would announce the key revocation via the Application Programming Interface (API), 
which would be detected by the wallets and cause them to initiate the following refresh 
protocol: the user discloses the coin’s public key C, the central bank’s signature s, and the 
blinding factor b to the central bank, enabling the central bank to verify the user’s 
legitimate withdrawal and to refund the unspent coin’s value. To detect a possible 
compromise of its key, the central bank can monitor the database for instances of deposits 
exceeding withdrawals. 
D. Scalability and Costs 
Our proposed scheme would be as efficient and as cost-effective as modern RTGS 
systems currently used by central banks. 
Scalability concerns the cost of growing processing capacity so that an increasing 
number of transactions can be processed with an adequate time to finality. The overall 
system cost can be low since the CBDC proposed here is software only. Spent coins must 
be stored until the denomination key pair that was used to sign the coins expires, for 
instance, via a rolling annual schedule, which keeps the database size bounded. The amount 




V. Regulatory and Policy Considerations 
In the proposed scheme, central banks do not learn the identities of consumers or 
merchants or the total transaction amounts. Central banks only see when electronic coins 
are released and when they are redeemed. Commercial banks continue to provide crucial 
customer and merchant authentication and, in particular, remain the guardians of KYC 
information. Commercial banks observe when merchants receive funds and can limit the 
amount of CBDC per transaction that an individual merchant may receive, if required. 
Additionally, transactions are associated with the relevant customer contracts. The resulting 
income transparency enables the system to be compliant with the AML/CFT regulations. If 
unusual patterns of merchant income are detected, the commercial bank, tax authorities, or 
law enforcement can obtain and inspect the business contracts underlying the payments to 
determine whether the suspicious activity is nefarious. The resulting income transparency is 
also a strong measure against tax evasion because merchants cannot underreport income or 
evade sales taxes. Overall, the system implements privacy-by-design and privacy-by-
default approaches (as, for instance, required by the EU’s General Data Protection 
Regulation). Merchants do not inherently learn the identity of their customers, banks have 
only necessary insights into their own customers’ activities, and central banks are blissfully 
divorced from detailed knowledge of citizens’ activities. 
In some countries, there are limits on cash withdrawals and payments for regulatory 
reasons. Such restrictions could also be implemented for CBDC in the proposed design. For 
example, consumers could be limited to withdrawing a certain amount per day, or 
commercial banks could be limited in terms of the total amount of CBDC they can convert. 
A potential financial stability concern often raised with retail CBDCs is banking 
sector disintermediation. Notably, retail CBDCs could make it easier to hoard vast amounts 
of central bank money. This could adversely affect the deposit funding of banks because 
the public would hold less of its money in the form of bank deposits. For countries whose 
currencies serve as safe-haven currencies, it could further lead to increased capital inflows 
during global risk-off periods, resulting in additional exchange rate appreciation pressures. 
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additional transaction, spend or deposit, because the transactions are essentially 
independent of each other. This additional power is attained by simply adding more 
hardware, often called partitioning or sharding. With so-called consistent hashing, hardware 
additions need not be disruptive. Any underlying database technology can be utilized. 
More concretely, the front-end logic at the central bank only needs to conduct a few 
signature operations, and a single CPU core can do a few thousand operations per second 
(see Bernstein and Lange 2020). If a single system is insufficient, it is easy to deploy 
additional front-end servers and direct the various commercial banks to balance their 
requests across the server farm or use a load balancer to distribute requests within the 
central bank’s infrastructure. 
The front-end servers need to communicate with a database to make transactions and 
to prevent double-spending. A single modern database server should be able to reliably 
handle tens of thousands of such operations per second. Operations are split easily across 
multiple database servers by merely assigning each database server a range of values for 
which it is responsible. This design ensures that individual transactions never cross shards. 
Hence, the back-end systems are also expected to scale linearly with the computing 
resources made available, again starting from a high baseline for a single system. 
The front-ends also need to communicate with the back-ends using an interconnect. 
Interconnects can support very large numbers of transactions per second. The size of an 
individual transaction is typically approximately 1–10 kilobytes. Thus, modern datacenter 
interconnects, switching at rates of 400 Gbit/s, can support millions of transactions per 
second. 
Finally, the total system cost is low. Securely storing 1–10 kilobytes per transaction 
for many years is likely to be the predominant cost of the system. Using Amazon Web 
Services pricing, we experimented with an earlier prototype of GNU Taler and found that 
the cost of the system (storage, bandwidth, and computation) at scale would be below USD 




V. Regulatory and Policy Considerations 
In the proposed scheme, central banks do not learn the identities of consumers or 
merchants or the total transaction amounts. Central banks only see when electronic coins 
are released and when they are redeemed. Commercial banks continue to provide crucial 
customer and merchant authentication and, in particular, remain the guardians of KYC 
information. Commercial banks observe when merchants receive funds and can limit the 
amount of CBDC per transaction that an individual merchant may receive, if required. 
Additionally, transactions are associated with the relevant customer contracts. The resulting 
income transparency enables the system to be compliant with the AML/CFT regulations. If 
unusual patterns of merchant income are detected, the commercial bank, tax authorities, or 
law enforcement can obtain and inspect the business contracts underlying the payments to 
determine whether the suspicious activity is nefarious. The resulting income transparency is 
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of central bank money. This could adversely affect the deposit funding of banks because 
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currencies serve as safe-haven currencies, it could further lead to increased capital inflows 




While this would be a serious concern with an account-based CBDC, it should be less of a 
concern with a token-based CBDC. First, hoarding a token-based CBDC entails risks of 
theft or loss similar to those of hoarding cash. Holding a few hundred dollars on a 
smartphone is probably an acceptable risk for many, but holding a very large amount is 
probably a less acceptable risk. Therefore, we would not expect significantly more hoarding 
than in the case of physical cash. 
However, should hoarding or massive conversions of money from bank deposits to 
CBDC become a problem, central banks would have several options. As noted, under the 
proposed design, central banks configure an expiration date for all signing keys, which 
implies that at a set date, the coins signed by those keys become invalid. When 
denomination keys expire and customers have to exchange coins signed with old 
denomination keys for new coins, the regulator could easily impose a conversion limit per 
customer to enforce a hard limit on the amount of CBDC that any individual can hoard. In 
addition, central banks could charge a fee if necessary. Such a refresh fee when coins are 
set to expire would effectively mean negative interest rates on CBDC and make CBDC less 
attractive as a store of value, as suggested by Bindseil (2020). In fact, it would be a 
straightforward implementation of Silvio Gesell’s idea of a carry tax on currency, famously 
referenced by Keynes (1936) and revived by Goodfriend (2000), Buiter and Panigirtzoglou 
(2003), and Agarwal and Kimball (2019). 
Concerning potential implications for monetary policy, we do not anticipate material 
effects because our CBDC is designed to replicate cash rather than bank deposits. The 
issuance, withdrawal and deposit of our CBCD correspond exactly to the issuance, 
withdrawal and deposit of banknotes. It is possible that a retail CBDC could have a 
different velocity of circulation than physical cash, but this would not be a material 




VI. Related Work 
As noted earlier, the CBDC proposed in the present paper is based on eCash and 
GNU Taler.18 Since Chaum’s original e-cash proposal, research has focused on three main 
issues. First, in Chaum’s original proposal, the coins were of fixed value and could only be 
spent in their entirety. Paying vast amounts with coins denominated in cents would be 
inefficient, so Okamoto (1995), Camenisch (2005), Canard and Gouget (2007), and Dold 
(2019) invented ways to address this issue. These solutions involve protocols for giving 
change or for providing divisibility of coins. 
A second issue is that transactions sometimes fail due to network outages, for 
instance. In this case, the system must make it possible for the funds to remain with the 
consumer without a negative impact on privacy. Endorsed e-cash proposed by Camenisch 
et al. (2007) and Dold (2019) both tackle this issue. Several of the above solutions violate 
the assurances of privacy for customers using these features, and all of them except Taler 
violate the requirement of income transparency. 
The third major issue, often neglected, is maintaining income transparency and thus 
AML and KYC compliance. Fuchsbauer et al. (2009) deliberately designed their system for 
disintermediation to provide more cash-like semantics. However, unlimited 
disintermediation is typically at odds with AML and KYC regulations, as it becomes 
impossible to attain any level of accountability. An example of such a design is ZCash, a 
distributed ledger that hides payer, payee, and transaction amount information from the 
network and is thus the perfect payment system for online crime. Only Taler offers both 
consistent customer privacy and income transparency while also providing efficient change, 
atomic swaps (see Camenisch 2007), and the ability to restore wallets from backup. 
Regarding payment systems for CBDCs, Danezis and Meiklejohn (2016) designed a 
scalable ledger with RSCoin. It is basically an RTGS system that is secured using the same 
 





cryptography that is used in Bitcoin. Like Taler, the design uses database sharding to 
achieve linear scalability. However, Danezis and Meiklejohn’s design does not have any 
provisions for privacy and lacks considerations for how to practically integrate the design 
with existing banking systems and processes.  
The European Central Bank’s EUROchain (see ECB 2019) is another prototype for a 
CBDC with a distributed ledger. Similar to the architecture proposed in the present paper, 
EUROchain uses a two-tier architecture with commercial banks acting as intermediaries. 
One crucial difference is how the systems try to combine privacy and AML compliance. 
While in our design, regulators could impose a limit on the amount of electronic cash that a 
bank account holder can withdraw over a certain time, EUROchain issues a limited number 
of “anonymity vouchers” that grant the receiver a limited number of transactions without 
AML checks. As these vouchers seem divorced from any token of value, it remains unclear 
how the design could avoid the emergence of a black market for “anonymity vouchers”. 
Moreover, EUROchain’s notion of anonymity is very different, in that their “anonymity 
vouchers” merely eliminate certain AML checks while preserving commercial banks’ 
ability to view how their consumers spend their electronic cash. Whereas Taler payers 
directly interact with merchants to spend their e-cash, the EUROchain system requires 
payers to instruct their commercial banks to access their CBDC. Therefore, EUROchain 
does not directly issue valuable tokens to consumers and instead relies on consumers to 
authenticate themselves to their commercial banks to access CBDC that the central bank 
effectively holds in escrow. Thus, it is unclear what privacy, performance, or security 
benefits EUROchain has over existing deposit money. 
VII. Conclusion 
With the emergence of Bitcoin and the recently proposed digital currencies from 
BigTech, such as Diem (formerly Libra), central banks ace growing competition from 
actors offering their own digital alternative to physical cash. Central banks’ decisions on 




CBDC. These benefits and risks, as well as the specific jurisdictional circumstances that 
define the scope of retail CBDC, are likely to differ from one country to another. 
If a central bank decides to issue a retail CBDC, we propose a token-based CBDC 
that combines transaction privacy with KYC and AML/CFT compliance. Such a CBDC 
would not compete with commercial bank deposits but rather replicate physical cash, 
thereby limiting financial stability and monetary policy risks. 
We have shown that the scheme proposed here would be as efficient and as cost-
effective as modern RTGSs operated by central banks. Electronic payments with our 
CBDC would only necessitate simple database transactions and miniscule amounts of 
bandwidth. The efficiency and cost-effectiveness, together with enhanced consumer 
usability caused by shifting from authentication to authorization, make this scheme likely to 
be the first to support the long-envisioned objective of online micropayments. In addition, 
the use of coins to cryptographically sign electronic contracts would enable the use of smart 
contracts. This, too, could lead to the emergence of entirely new applications for payment 
systems. Although our system is not based on DLT, it could easily be integrated with such 
technologies if required by financial market infrastructures in the future. 
Just as important, however, a retail CBDC must preserve cash as a privacy-friendly 
commons under citizens’ individual control. This can be attained with the scheme proposed 
in this paper, and central banks can avoid significant disruptions to their monetary policy 
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